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In search for a perfect financial performance 
measure, the concept of residual income had 
been introduced as an improvement upon 
accounting income in measuring perfor-
mance. Started with the pioneering applica-
tions by Lewis [Lewis, 1955] and Solomons 
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[Solomons, 1965], the notion of residual 
income came to be the object of extensive 
debate in the management accounting lit-
erature in the 1970s [Amey, 1969; Flower, 
1971; Bromwich, 1973; Amey, 1975; Tom-
kins, 1975; Emmanuel, Otley, 1976]. Some 
accounting scholars (e. g. [Anthony, 1973]) 
had long advocated the residual income mea-
sures for evaluating business performance 
and for use in the pay-for performance com-
pensation systems.
While the origins of the concept trace 
back to the 19th century, it had actually 
taken increasing interest of academia only 
in the early 1990th after the publication of 
analytical work by Ohlson [Ohlson, 1995] 
and Feltham and Ohlson [Feltham, Ohlson, 
1995]. The residual income based valuation 
relationship stating that the economic val-
ue of an entity at a point in time is equal 
to the sum of the book value of the entity 
plus the present value of all of the entity’s 
expected future residual incomes has become 
a common feature of research into the role 
of accounting numbers in business valuation 
[Feltham, Ohlson, 1996; Dechow, Hutton, 
Sloan, 1999; Penman, Sougiannis, 1997; 
My ers, 1999; Francis, Olsson, Oswald, 2000]1. 
About the same time the residual income 
had been taken up by value-based manage-
ment practitioners as a means of measuring 
past performance and rewarding managers 
[Stewart, 1991; McTaggart et al., 1994], 
triggering an active debate in the manage-
rial accounting literature. Bromwich and 
Walker [Bromwich, Walker, 1998] review 
theoretical papers on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the value-based management 
approaches and consider the potential for 
using residual income as the basis for per-
formance-related reward systems. The work 
by [Ittner, Larcker, 2001] is a standard ref-
erence for extensive survey of the empirical 
1 Most research papers, as noted by [Ohlson, 
2002, p. 248], tend to refer residual income valu-
ation relationship as the accounting based valua­
tion formula. This is also the case in the financial 
statement analysis texts [Bernstein, Wild, 1997; 
Penman, 2001].
management accounting studies summarized 
through the lens of the value-based manage-
ment accounting framework, and [Malmi, 
Ikäheimo, 2003] examine research-based 
evidence on how these concepts are actu-
ally applied.
Recurrently appearing publications indi-
cate sustainable interest in the dual role of 
residual income as the performance measure 
and valuation attribute. [Dekker et al., 2012] 
review developments in the field and explore 
the importance of value-based measures for 
performance evaluation of the middle-level 
managers responsible for firms’ primary 
operating units. They define the value-based 
measures as “the financial performance mea-
sures that include a capital charge for the 
use of (debt and equity) capital” [Dekker et 
al., 2012, p. 1216]. Heinrichs and coauthors 
[Heinrichs et al., 2013] building on Lundholm 
and O’Keefe’s theoretical framework [Lund-
holm, O’Keefe, 2001] propose and empiri-
cally test an extended residual income val-
uation model that accounts for non-ideal 
valuation conditions. [McLaren, Appleyard, 
Mitchell, 2016] using institutional theory 
as a framework explore and explain the pro-
cesses involved in the creation, use and de-
cline of comprehensive residual income based 
management accounting systems.
Probably the best-known member in the 
family of residual income approaches is the 
Economic Value Added (EVA®) trademarked 
and promoted by the Stern Stewart & Co.2 
In its essence, EVA is the residual income 
earned from operations, or residual operat-
2 Trademarked EVA® is unique in that its cal-
culation involves a potential set of up to 160 ad-
justments to the conventional accounting data. 
However, according to [Young, O’Byrne, 2000, 
p. 257], the typical corporate EVA user makes (in 
most cases) no more than five adjustments. The 
explanations Young and O’Byrne give for this re-
duction are twofold: (a) managers are reluctant to 
deviate from accounting-based numbers; (b) com-
panies have found that most of the suggested ad-
justments have little impact on profit and capital. 
The issue of adjustments to the accounting state-
ments is still the subject of debate.
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ing income [Penman, 2001, p. 424]3. Putting 
the residual operating income in place as 
a  basic indicator of financial performance 
makes sense, as it brings a focus to the core 
business performance, to the profitability 
of operations that add value. Onwards, we 
will use EVA as a common abbreviation for 
the residual operating income methodology, 
which by its design and purpose falls on the 
crossroads of accounting, performance mea-
surement and financial management.
Extensive acceptance in the corporate 
world and diversity of the EVA related lit-
erature4 pushed the metric into the pages of 
the corporate finance, management account-
ing and performance management texts.5 As 
an evidence of its sustainable popularity, the 
search query for “economic value added” in 
the Russian Science Citation Index database 
returns more than 70 publications for the 
period from 2015 to 2019, which provide 
a  wide range of examples of applying the 
EVA metric to measuring performance of 
Russian enterprises in the real and banking 
sectors, and for a business valuation based 
on the economic value added model.
Being in place for decades, the EVA met-
ric and its measuring abilities had been an 
object of extensive empirical research, crit-
icism from academia and proposals for im-
provements6. The most cited publication are 
[Biddle, Bowen, Wallace, 1997], who tested 
3 Residual operating income is also referred to 
as the economic profit [Koller, Goedhart, Wessels, 
2010, p. 117].
4 For example, [Sharma, Kumar, 2010] cumu-
late and categorise 112 papers published from 1994 
to 2008 covering various EVA related issues. 
5 See, for example, [Grinblatt, Titman, 2001, 
p. 341–343; Brealey, Myers, 2010, p. 299–301, 709; 
Arnold, 2005, p. 181–190; Merchant, Van der Stede, 
2007, p. 451–452; Bhimani et al., 2008, p. 650–651; 
Atrill, McLaney, 2009, p. 350–355; Garrison, No-
reen, Brewer, 2010, p. 526–527; Horngren, Datar, 
Rajan, 2012, p. 812–813].
6 The number of the EVA related research pa-
pers posed to the SSRN´s eLibrary (https://www.
ssrn.com/) approaches thee hundred, with more 
than 34 000 downloads of the highest ranking 
among them.
assertions that EVA is more highly associ-
ated with stock returns and firm values, 
[Wallace, 1997] with the empirical evidence 
on how compensation plans based on resid-
ual income change managers’ behavior, 
[O’Han lon, Peasnell, 1998], who reviewed 
the EVA system in the light of its purpose 
to promote value-maximizing behavior in 
corporate managers, [Chen, Dodd, 2001], 
who examined the value relevance of three 
profitability measures: operating income, 
residual income, and EVA. More recent au-
thoritative papers are [Malmi, Ikäheimo, 
2003] with the real world evidence on how 
the Value Based Management, and especial-
ly EVA, are actually applied by corporations, 
and [Baker, Deo, Mukherjee, 2009], who 
evaluate common concerns about EVA, iden-
tify the major concerns (distortions caused 
by the depreciation method, complex adjust-
ments, short-term focus, low correlation 
with the stock price), and offer some recom-
mendations for using EVA more effectively.
EVA refinements, intended to improve the 
quality and informational content of perfor-
mance measurement, evolved mainly along 
two ideas. The first, is replacing the account-
ing depreciation by the economic depreciation 
[Bodie, 1982; Bierman, 1988] to eliminate 
discrepancies between the accounting and 
economic income [Young, O’Byrne, 2000, 
p. 210–218; Ibragimov, 2007; Brealey, Myers, 
2010, p. 303–305]. The second is replacing 
the book value of the firm’s assets in the EVA 
formula by their market value [Bacidore et 
al., 1997; Albrecht, 1998]. Yet, there is the 
third, and, perhaps, more basic issue over-
looked by researchers and practitioners. Does 
EVA actually measure what it is intended 
for? The paper contributes to existing lit-
erature by explicitly addressing this question.
Since the EVA (and the residual operating 
income in general) is supposed to deal with 
that part of business activities where mana-
gerial actions take place, the metric should 
not be affected by market movements that 
affect the share price, or by financing deci-
sions that generally belong to the corporate 
headquarters. The latter is important in the 
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performance measurement context, since, for 
example, changing the leverage by adding or 
reducing debt moves the opportunity cost of 
capital employed, thus inducing changes in 
the residual operating income. However, 
these movements in the performance indica-
tor are an outcome of actions within the 
finance department of the firm; they are be-
yond the business managers’ control and, 
therefore, should not be their responsibility.
While the concept of the residual operat-
ing income may reasonably be perceived as 
developed up to the point where no further 
improvements are visible, taking a closer look 
at the metric fundamentals suggests that 
EVA may yield uninformative or even mis-
leading reference point for the performance 
evaluation [Ibragimov, 2015], where the mea-
surement distortions emerge along two di-
mensions.
The first and probably critical dimension 
is a measurement bias inherent in the EVA 
design. As the subsequent exposition clari-
fies, the bias stems from contrasting the net 
operating profit after tax (NOPAT), which 
is an output of firm’s operating activities 
[Stewart, 1991; Koller, Goedhart, Wessels, 
2010], with the capital charge that accounts 
not only for the opportunity cost of funds 
investors put into the firm, but also for the 
side effects of financing, and the latter is 
introduced by applying the tax adjustment 
(1 – T) to the cost of debt in the convention-
al weighted average cost of capital (WACC) 
formula.
The second source of potential distortions 
is the conventional simplifying assumptions 
in calculating the WACC and subsequent in-
consistencies in the performance metric cal-
culations. Accounting for the tax effect of 
leverage in the discount rate is at the core 
of the standard valuation techniques like 
discounting the free cash flows at the after-
tax WACC. However, calculating the capital 
charge in EVA via the opportunity cost of 
funds adjusted for the tax deductibility of 
interest yields artificial figures that gener-
ally fall between the economic profit earned 
from operations and the total economic prof-
it earned from both the operating and finan-
cial activities. The calculated EVA could take 
a positive value just due to the interest tax 
shield effect imputed by the after-tax WACC 
in the capital charge component of the met-
ric, and this positive value would be gener-
ally (and, perhaps, erroneously) interpreted 
as an indication of the operating performance 
above the minimum acceptable hurdle.
Furthermore, the current WACC and 
hence the current EVA are highly sensitive 
to the changes in the present value of future 
growth opportunities, implying that contrary 
to a common sense the EVA assessment of 
past performance depends on anticipated fu-
ture events unrelated to the financial results 
in the period under evaluation. Thus, the 
measurement bias induced by the EVA’s ba-
sic design may distort performance assess-
ment and remuneration incentives.
In the pages that follow, we demonstrate 
how and why the measurement bias occurs, 
and propose a three-step path to calibrate 
financial performance evaluation. First, we 
explicitly recognize the two sources of income 
attributable to investors in a firm: primar-
ily the NOPAT generated by the firm’s core 
assets, and an interest tax shield supplement 
arising as a side effect of financing activities. 
Second, we use the cost of unlevered equity 
kU (corresponding to the risk of firm’s as-
sets), rather than the WACC, to calculate 
the full charge on the book invested capital. 
And third, we measure the aggregate eco-
nomic profit and its operating constituent 
concurrently with two nested metrics: the 
Operating EVA (OEVA) and the Total EVA 
(TEVA).
The OEVA is a financial performance in-
dicator that provides an informative view of 
ongoing operations, and the TEVA is an un-
biased modification of EVA for the purpose 
of measuring overall corporate financial per-
formance. Both measures of past performance 
are unaffected by the anticipated changes in 
the firm’s future, and the key feature of the 
OEVA is that it is unaffected by the firm’s 
financial policies and their side effects aris-
ing in the course of firm’s activities.
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The power of the dual OEVA–TEVA anal-
ysis lies in the added managerially relevant 
information it can offer, and in the transpar-
ent computationally simple financial mea-
sures of performance it provides. An impor-
tant feature of the OEVA–TEVA approach 
is that it maintains consistency with the 
fundamental valuation by the cash flow dis-
counting and can be applied as a self-stand-
ing methodology in the capital budgeting 
and business valuation. Equivalence of the 
OEVA–TEVA and the free cash flow (FCF) 
valuation methods is formally proved in the 
Appendix A, and the terminal value formu-
las for the OEVA–TEVA valuation are derived 
from the standard FCF constant growth for-
mula in the Appendix B.
A hurdle rate for operations
A required return for different sources of 
income depends on a riskiness of the related 
activity. Residual income from operations is 
earnings for the operations and so it should 
be calculated and discounted using the re-
quired return that compensates for the risk 
in the operations, i. e. the cost of capital for 
operations. As the firm’s providers of funds, 
shareholders and lenders, together hold all 
the firm’s assets, the rate of return that is 
required to compensate for the overall risk 
they take on is the risk of assets, generally 
referred to as the cost of unlevered equity 
kU. Since the firm is a portfolio of stock and 
debt, the total required return of the firm 
is also equal to the weighted average of the 
expected returns of securities in it. Thus 
the relevant cost of capital for operations is 
the before tax weighted average cost of cap-
ital, or, equivalently, the required return to 
unlevered equity,
1 1
U E E D D
t t t t tk w k w k− −= + , (1)
where Etk  is the period t cost of levered eq-
uity, Dtk  is the cost of debt, and the weights 
1 1 1
E E
t t tw V V− − −=  and 1 1 1
D D
t t tw V V− − −=  have to 
be equal to the beginning of the period t 
economic values of equity 1
E
tV −  and debt 1
D
tV −  
relative to the overall economic value of the 
levered firm 1 1 1
E D
t t tV V V− − −= + . These weights 
are generally referred to as the market 
weights, and using them in the cost of cap-
ital calculations is an established rule traced 
in corporate finance, accounting, valuation 
and value based management texts.7
Note, that (1) is strictly correct when 
the (systematic) risk of cash flows from the 
tax deductibility of interest is the same as 
the risk of unlevered equity, and throughout 
the paper we assume, that the appropriate 
discount rate for the interest tax shields is 
the cost of unlevered equity. Although, in 
rigorous theory, this assumption is not ap-
plicable for all feasible financial policies of 
firms, it is widely accepted as a reasonable 
approximation in cash flows valuation mod-
elling [Miles, Ezzell, 1985; Harris, Pringle, 
1985; Schueler and Krotter, 2008]. Re gard-
ing the debt financing, it is generally as-
sumed at market terms, meaning that the 
interest rate on debt in any period is equal 
to the cost of debt capital, and the value of 
debt DtV  at any time t is equal to its ac-
counting book value Dt.
We do not challenge the fact that a firm 
paying interest at a rate Dtk  on debt out-
standing Dt –1 benefits from the tax deduct-
ibility of interest and obtains the right for 
the tax shield (TS) subsidy 1
D
t t t tTS k D T−= . 
The point here is that the tax advantage of 
debt does not affect the risk inherent in the 
firm’s operating activities and corresponding 
required return. The regular tax adjustment 
(1 – T) applied to the cost of debt in the 
conventional weighted average cost of cap-
ital formula
1 1 (1 )
E E D D
t t t t tWACC w k w k T− −≡ + −  (2)
is generally interpreted as the after tax cost 
of debt. However, the net expense (1 )Dt tk T−  
incurred by the firm is actually the effective 
book cost of borrowing, not the economic cost 
of debt capital, which is in essence the cred-
itors’ opportunity cost contingent on the 
7 See [Yong, O’Byrne, 2000, p. 253–255; Pen-
man, 2001, p. 432; Koller, Goedhart, Wessels, 2010, 
p. 802; Berk, DeMarzo, 2012, ch. 12].
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 expected return on alternative investments 
in the same risk class. What creditors expect 
to collect are the full (not after-tax) interest 
payments, and regarding the economic cost 
of debt capital the tax adjustment (1 – T) to 
make it the “after-tax cost” is irrelevant with 
the implication that the composite return 
expected by all firm’s investors is the cost of 
unlevered equity kU, not the after-tax WACC.
Discounting the expected as if fully eq-
uity financed cash flows at the tax adjusted 
cost of capital is the standard technique in 
valuation that incorporates the tax benefits 
of financing decisions indirectly via the de-
nominator of the present value calculations. 
However, the capital charge calculations in 
the EVA formula by applying the after tax 
WACC implicitly assume that WACC is the 
appropriate rate of return required to com-
pensate investors for the risk of investing 
in the firm, while it is not. In effect, the 
after-tax WACC is an overall expected return 
corresponding to the particular mix of both 
operating and financing activities.
By combining expressions (1) and (2) one 
can see that the after-tax WACC is actu-
ally the cost of unlevered equity Utk  reduced 
by the amount equal to the ratio of period 
t tax shield to the beginning of period val-
ue Vt – 1 of the levered firm8:
1
tU
t t
t
TS
WACC k
V
−
= − . (3)
Intuitively, it means that investors in 
the firm (debt and equity) together may be 
willing to accept a rate of return from op-
erations lower than prescribed by the as-
sociated risk kU on condition that the short-
fall in operations is covered by the interest 
tax shield subsidy from the government. 
However, this exogenous benefit does not 
make operations themselves less risky, and 
consequently, any metric based on a spread 
between the return on investment and the 
WACC is generally predisposed to deliver 
8 The formula was first introduced by [Taggard, 
1991] and derived in a more general setting by 
[Tham, Vélez-Pareja, 2004].
a  misleading benchmark in measuring op-
erating performance. We illustrate this point 
with numerical examples in the next section.
Measurement errors induced  
by the basic design of EVA
EVA is designed to be a measure of operat-
ing performance. It departs from the net 
after tax operating income and subtracts 
the charge on the book invested capital (IC) 
to generate this income:
1t t t tEVA NOPAT IC WACC−= − ⋅ . (4)
Since the after-tax WACC sets an under-
stated benchmark for the opportunity cost 
of funds employed, the straightforward im-
plication of applying WACC to calculate the 
capital charge is that EVA will generally 
overstate results when implemented as the 
financial measure of efficiency in operations.
Assume, for example, a hypothetical Al-
pha Corporation with the following book 
and market information at time t = 1: IC0 = 
= $845, EBIT1 = $120, D0 = $380, kD = 6.0%, 
T = 35%, V0 = $950, and kU = 9.9%. Calcu-
lations from this data yield
( )1 1 1NOPAT EBIT T= −  = 
= 120 ⋅ (1 − 0.35) = $78.00,
TS1 = 0.06 ⋅ 380 ⋅ 0.35 = $7.98,
WACC1 = 9.90% – (7.98/950) = 9.06%,
1 1 0 1EVA NOPAT IC WACC= − ⋅  =  
= 78 − 845 ⋅ 9.06% = $1.44.
Positive EVA apparently indicates that 
the Alpha’s dollar return is above the min-
imum acceptable level. However, EVA1 = 
= $1.44 is the difference of NOPAT1 = $78.00 
earned from operations, which is, in fact, 
6.8% below the factual required dollar re-
turn of IC kU0 ⋅  = 845 ⋅ 9.9% = $83.66, and 
the capital charge of 0 1IC WACC⋅  = 845 × 
× 9.06% = $76.56, which is imputed (by the 
“after tax” adjustment in WACC) to be 8.5% 
lower than the $83.66 dollar opportunity 
cost of capital employed. Subtracting the 
full capital charge based on the factual 
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benchmark kU = 9.9% from NOPAT1, one 
finds a negative value 78.00 – 83.66 = −$5.66 
as an input for judgment, indicating that 
contrary to the positive EVA-signal the op-
erating assets are underperforming. This 
example advocates that EVA could be mis-
leading when used for its intended purpose.
Next, recall that the two basic sources 
of income attributable to providers of funds, 
both debt and equity, are the NOPAT from 
operations and the tax savings, arising from 
tax deductibility of interest expenses. By 
rationally capturing the tax advantages of 
debt, managers can mitigate poor returns 
from operations and even pull the aggregate 
financial result above the threshold required 
by investors. However, decisions on the side 
of financing per se do not affect the operat-
ing efficiency of the firm, as well as they 
do not reduce the risk inherent in operations. 
The total economic profit earned by a firm 
(the excess of earnings over the opportu-
nity cost of capital invested in the business) 
is a composition of operating earnings above 
the hurdle for operations and the benefits 
gained due to the tax deductibility of inter-
est. This amendment alters the assessment 
of Alpha’s performance.
Going back to numbers, the negative value 
of difference between the operating profit and 
the full capital charge 1 0
UNOPAT IC k− ⋅  = 
= −$5.66 is a clear warning of operating 
return being lower than required to cover 
the opportunity cost of funds. However, 
adding the contribution from financing, the 
shortfall in operations is more than covered 
by the tax savings on interest TS1 = $7.98. 
The aggregate economic profit of the Al-
pha Corporation amounts to −5.66 + 7.98 = 
= +$2.32, which is a healthy overall outcome 
warranted by the tax advantage of debt. 
Another observation from this readjusted 
viewpoint is that the conventional EVA1 = 
= $1.44 significantly (by 38%) understates 
the aggregate economic profit in the mea-
surement period, suggesting that EVA may 
also yield a biased reference point for mak-
ing decisions when accepted as a flow finan-
cial measure of firm’s overall performance.
In sum, EVA accounts for the tax benefits 
of debt indirectly through the reduced cost 
of capital and the lower capital charge as 
a substitute for the direct increase in income 
by dollars of actually earned interest tax 
shields. Since WACC is not the threshold 
rate of return for operations, but the inves-
tors’ required return for a particular blend 
of operating and financing activities, the 
conventional EVA-based analysis may produce 
a fuzzy assessment of financial performance 
and distort management remuneration.
Calibrated tools for measuring 
performance
A sensible path to sharpen the view of per-
formance is to decompose the whole into the 
operating and financing components, and to 
evaluate them concurrently to see the con-
tribution of each into the end-result in the 
measurement period. The logical starting 
point is the core operations, and we intro-
duce the Operating EVA (OEVA) as a metric 
for measuring operating performance:
1
U
t t tOEVA NOPAT IC k−≡ − ⋅ . (5)
By applying the cost of unlevered equity 
to calculate the capital charge, we make two 
important modifications. First, we account 
for the factual required return on capital 
employed (both debt and equity), and second, 
we eliminate distortions that may arise out 
of the side effects of financing decisions 
implicitly introduced into the assessment 
of operating performance by the conven-
tional WACC–based EVA.
OEVA can be expressed in an equivalent 
form as the beginning of period invested cap-
ital multiplied by the operating performance 
spread (the difference between the return on 
invested capital ROICt 1t t tI NOPAT IC −≡  and 
the cost of unlevered equity kU):
( )1 Ut t tOEVA IC ROIC k−≡ ⋅ − . (6)
For the purpose of measuring firm’s over-
all performance, the Total EVA (TEVA) is 
defined as the sum of OEVA and the inter-
est tax shield:
146 R. G.  Ibragimov, I. Vélez-Pareja
RMJ 17 (2): 139–158 (2019)
t t tTEVA OEVA TS≡ + . (7)
TEVA explicitly adds the interest tax 
subsidy from the government (a side effect 
of debt financing) to what is earned by the 
firm in excess of dollar opportunity cost of 
funds invested in its business activities:
TEVA NOPAT IC k TSt t t
U
t= − ⋅ +−1 . (8)
Remembering the conventional relation
( )1t t tNOPAT NI Int T= + ⋅ − , (9)
the Total EVA can be restated in terms of 
net income (NI) and interest expenses (Int):
1
U
t t t tTEVA NI Int IC k−= + − ⋅ . (10)
Expression (10) provides an intuitive in-
terpretation for the metric: TEVA is an ag-
gregate income of the stockholders and debt 
holders less the dollar opportunity cost of 
the book capital invested to earn this income. 
The advantage of formulation (10) is that 
it requires minimum effort to collect input 
data. To calculate TEVA analyst needs the 
net income and the interest expenses from 
the Income Statement and the total assets 
less non-interest bearing current liabilities 
from the Balance Sheet.9
Calculation of TEVA by the formula (7) 
requires explicit estimation of the tax 
shields, which in practice may not be as 
simple as the interest expenses times the 
corporate tax rate. In a general case, the 
interest tax shield in a particular period is 
a piecewise linear function of earnings before 
interest and tax for that period, and it may 
also be affected by other sources of tax de-
ductibility available to the firm, such as 
losses carried forward, exchange losses and 
inflation adjustments to the equity book 
value in financial statements.10 The TEVA 
expression (10) captures these effects (im-
plicitly) from the data in the financial state-
ments.
9 This idea was originally introduced in [Vélez-
Pareja, Tham, 2004].
10 For an extensive discussion of these issues, 
see [Vélez-Pareja, Tham, 2010].
To see how EVA is formally related to 
TEVA and OEVA, just substitute the WACC 
formulation (3) into the formal definition (4) 
of EVA, and after elementary rearrange-
ments obtain
1
1
1
1
.
t
t t t
t
t
t t
t
IC
EVA OEVA TS
V
MVA
TEVA TS
V
−
−
−
−
= + ⋅ =
= − ⋅
 (11)
If in period t there is a positive tax shield 
contribution to the investors’ income, i. e. 
TSt > 0, then EVAt exceeds the operating 
component (OEVAt) of the total economic 
profit by the fraction ( )1 1t tIC V− −  of the TSt. 
And when the Market Value Added (MVA),
1 1 1t t tMVA V IC− − −≡ − , (12)
is also positive, then EVAt is lower than the 
total economic profit (TEVAt) in period t by 
the amount of the TSt multiplied by the 
ratio ( )1 1t tMVA V− − , thus falling between 
the values of the OEVAt and TEVAt.
Summing up, the conventional EVA cal-
culated by applying the after tax WACC to 
impose the capital charge on the operating 
earnings will generally overestimate the 
economic profit from operations, will match 
the aggregate economic profit when MVA 
is zero, and can take hoax values higher 
than TEVA in cases where MVA is negative. 
All three metrics, EVA, OEVA and TEVA, 
would be expected to yield one and the same 
value when there is no contribution associ-
ated with the debt financing. In fact, when 
TSt = 0, equation (11) immediately reduces 
to EVAt = OEVAt = TEVAt, and an intuitive 
example here is an all equity financing. 
Another relevant situation would be the case 
of a levered firm incurring losses in period 
t and therefore no profits to shield by the 
interest expenses.
The formal analysis above confirms the 
observations of previous section. By its basic 
design, EVA is prone to be fuzzy, in sense 
that it measures neither the operating, nor 
the total profits actually earned by a firm in 
excess of the dollar opportunity costs of the 
capital employed. Fundamentally, the scale 
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of measurement distortion depends on the 
amount of tax benefits from debt in the mea-
surement period, and on the IC to V ratio.
Measurement improvements
In addition to the measurement slips in-
duced by the EVA design, there are also 
other sources of potentially significant dis-
tortions in the EVA-based performance eval-
uation. This section covers the relevant is-
sues emphasizing how and why the cali-
brated measures, OEVA and TEVA, perform 
better than the conventional EVA.
Eliminating the future growth penalty  
on past performance
A notable situation where the EVA design 
leads to misrepresentation of results is when 
a firm experiences a shift in the value of its 
future growth opportunities. The effect aris-
ing is closely related to the issue of account-
ing for the capital charge, spotted in the 
practitioners literature as “an important 
but  neglected area for research” [Young, 
O’Byrne, 2004, p. 253]. To illustrate, assume 
that all previously stated financial data for 
the Alpha Corporation remain unchanged at 
time t = 2 as they were at time t = 1, except 
for the beginning of period value of equity, 
which has doubled (due to emergence at t = 1 
of inexistent at t = 0 future growth opportu-
nities) from V0E = V0 – D0 = 950 – 380 = $570 
at t = 0 to V1E = $1140 at t = 1. A higher 
equity value entails a higher cost of capital 
followed by a higher capital charge, and the 
latter transforms the Alpha Corporation 
from a positive EVA company into a negative 
EVA company. Specifically,
V1 = 380 + 1140 = $1520,
WACC2 = 9.90% – (7.98/1520) = 9.38%,
EVA2 = 78 – 845 ⋅ 9.38% = −$1.22.
Successive EVA figures indicate a dete-
rioration in performance. However, there 
are no changes in profits or assets base gen-
erating those profits, as well as in the finan-
cial ratios like the profit margin, assets 
turnover, return on invested capital etc. 
Altogether, Alpha’s performance in periods 1 
and 2 is stable by any conventional account-
ing criteria, and the negative signal prompt-
ed by the observed EVA figures is contrary 
to the factual results. The origin of this 
controversy is the capital charge penalty 
imposed on the current EVA by the WACC 
appreciation at time t = 2, the latter coming 
from the reduced tax shield adjustment:
V V V V TS V TS V
WACC WACC
E E
1 0 1 0 2 1 1 0
2 1
> ⇒ > ⇒ < ⇒
⇒ > .
From the standpoint of performance as-
sessment, both the increase in WACC and the 
higher capital charge following the increase 
in equity value (due to earlier unavailable 
future growth opportunities) are artificial 
effects unrelated to the past and current per-
formance. Invested capital, its opportunity 
costs, profits and tax saving on interest, all 
are the same at t = 1 and at t = 2. Therefore, 
switching from a positive EVA1 = $1.44 to 
a negative EVA2 = −$1.22 is a manifestation 
of the bias introduced into the performance 
measurement by the EVA design.
Everything falls into place when the 
calibrated measures are applied to evaluate 
performance. Substituting data for the Al-
pha Corporation into (5) and (7) obtain
OEVA2 = OEVA1 = 78 – 845 ⋅ 9.90% = 
= −$5.66,
TEVA2 = TEVA1 = −5.66 + 7.98 = 
= +$2.32.
The operating performance indicator 
OEVA is stable in periods 1 and 2, but op-
erations are inefficient since NOPAT is low-
er than required to cover the opportunity 
cost of capital invested in operating assets. 
Aggregate financial performance, as indi-
cated by TEVA, is also stable, and tax sav-
ings on interest ensure a positive overall 
result. The effect of switching from positive 
in period 1 to negative in period 2 econom-
ic profit is eliminated when OEVA and TEVA 
are used for performance evaluation.
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Cancelling the inconsistency errors
Exposition and conclusions in the previous 
sections regarding the measurement bias in-
herent in the EVA design and the relation-
ship between EVA, OEVA and TEVA implic-
itly assume that the necessary conditions for 
consistency in calculating WACC are satis-
fied. The basic three of them are: (a) the 
weights are based on the economic (market) 
values of debt and equity at the beginning 
of measurement period; (b) interest and tax-
es are paid in the period they are accrued; 
and (c) earnings before interest and tax ex-
ceed the interest on debt [Vélez-Pareja, 
Ibragimov, Tham, 2008]. However, it is not 
uncommon in practice that these assump-
tions are not met; and since the capital 
charge component of EVA is highly sensitive 
to the cost of capital, the outcome of EVA-
based analysis will depend upon how WACC 
is calculated de facto. Inconsistencies easily 
slip in when the formula (2) is used; intro-
ducing even more confusion in the EVA-based 
performance assessment. In this section we 
explain with examples how the inconsistency 
errors occur in the EVA calculations, and 
demonstrate that the dual OEVA–TEVA fi-
nancial performance measurement eliminates 
even the possibility of such errors.
Imputed tax shields error. To be specific, 
assume for instance that under the terms 
of loan agreement, the Alpha Corporation 
does not have to pay interest in the period 1, 
all other data being the same as stated earlier. 
Given that 0 0
DV D=  = $380 and V0 = $950, 
the value of Alpha’s equity is 0
EV  = 950 – 380 = 
= $570. Therefore, the Alpha’s capital struc-
ture is 40% debt, 0
Dw  = 380/950 = 0.40, and 
60% equity, 0
Ew  = 1 – 0
Dw  = 0.60.
To calculate WACC by the formula (2) 
we have to calculate the cost of levered eq-
uity first, and this is done by the formula
( )1
1
D
tE U U D
t t t tE
t
V
k k k k
V
−
−
= + − . (13)
This formulation does not include a tax 
term (1 – T), since tax shields are assumed 
to be as risky as the company’s unlevered 
cash flows [Taggart, 1991; Inselbag, Kaufold, 
1997; Tham, Vélez-Pareja, 2004].
Substituting the relevant data for the 
Alpha Corporation yields
1
Ek  = 9.90% + (0.40/0.60) × 
× ( 9.90% – 6.0%) = 12.50%,
WACC1 = 0.60 ⋅ 12.50% + 
+ 0.40 ⋅ 6.0% ⋅ (1 – 0.35) = 9.06%.
NOPAT and IC are unaffected by the in-
terest payments, therefore
EVA1 = 78 – 845 ⋅ 9.06% = $1.44.
Note, that the resulting figure EVA1 = 
= $1.44 is the same as if the interest has 
been paid and the interest tax shield has 
been earned. However, when a firm does not 
pay interest, the benefits of sheltering in-
come from tax are forgone, and the eco-
nomic profits actually earned are reduced 
by the tax shields missed. This is not cap-
tured by the conventional EVA, because the 
tax shield effect is introduced into the cal-
culations irrespective of interest payments 
by the (1 – T) adjustment to the cost of debt 
in the formula (2).
OEVA and TEVA are free from this im-
puted tax shield bias and react accordingly. 
Since the Alfa pays no interest on debt, then 
TS1 = 0 and TEVA1 = OEVA1 = 78.00 – 83.66 = 
= −$5.66. Operating performance is unaf-
fected (as captured by OEVA), and TEVA 
equals the total economic profit actually 
earned exclusive of any virtual amount of 
nonexistent interest tax shields (counted in 
EVA). In line with the analysis in previous 
section, the values of both metrics match, 
as will also the value of EVA if calculated 
consistently. In fact, applying formula (4) 
instead of (2) immediately obtain, that in 
the case of zero tax shield WACC is equal 
to the cost of unlevered equity kU, and there-
fore, EVA = OEVA = TEVA.
The target and the book capital structure 
errors. According to the established rule in 
corporate finance, WACC should be the mar-
ket weighted average of the cost of equity 
and the cost of debt. A widespread substitute 
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for this rule is to use the long term target 
weights to calculate WACC. Another fairly 
common approach is using the book weights. 
Both methods are attractively simple, but 
computational simplicity comes at a cost of 
added distortions in performance assessment.
Assume, for example, that for the purpose 
of calculating WACC the management of 
Alpha Corporation adheres to the target debt 
weight wD = 0.5. Under the constant lever-
age assumption the formula (3) transforms 
into the WACC model introduced by [Harris, 
Pringle, 1985]
WACC k
TS
V
k
D k T
V
k w k T
t
U t
t
U t t
D
t
U D
t
D
= − =
= − = −
−
−
−
1
1
1
,
 (14)
and, therefore,
WACC1 = 9.90% – 6.0% ⋅ 0.5 ⋅ 0.35 =
= 8.85%,
EVA1 = 78 – 845 ⋅ 8.85% = $3.22.
One can see that calculations using the 
target weights in WACC yield the EVA 
figure more than two times higher than 
EVA1 = $1.44 with the market weights in 
WACC, and 38% higher than the attainable 
TEVA1 = $2.32.
With the book weights in WACC, the EVA 
view of the Alpha’s performance looks dis-
torted as well. Given IC0 = $845 and D0 = 
= $380, the book value of equity is 845 – 380 = 
= $465, and the book weights are wD = 
= 380/845 = 0.45, wE = 1 – wD = 0.55. Con-
sequently
k1E = 9.90% + (0.45/0.55) ×
× (9.90% – 6.0%) = 13.09%,
WACC1 = 0.55 ⋅ 13.09% + 0.45 ×
× 6.0% ⋅ (1 – 0.35) = 8.96%,
EVA1 = 78 – 845 ⋅ 8.96% = $2.32.
Since the book value of the Alpha’s in-
vested capital is significantly lower than its 
market value, calculations yield understat-
ed WACC1 = 8.96% < 9.06% and overstated 
EVA1 = $2.32 > $1.44.
In contrast to the WACC based capital 
charge in EVA, the opportunity cost of cap-
ital applied to calculate the capital charge 
in OEVA and TEVA is the risk of assets kU 
(the cost of unlevered equity), which is un-
affected by the firm’s capital structure. 
Accordingly, OEVA and TEVA are free from 
errors associated with the target capital 
structure assumption and the book capital 
structure simplification.
Practical implications
Distortions in the performance assessment 
induced by the EVA design and supplement 
aberrations arising from inconsistency or 
simplifying conventions when calculating 
WACC can lead to misrepresentations and 
wrong conclusions regarding the firm’s fi-
nancial performance, trigger unintended 
errors in making decisions and produce dis-
tortions in the corporate reward system. 
A strong argument in favor of calibrated 
metrics proposed in the paper is that all 
prerequisites for the emergence of such er-
rors are eliminated in the performance mea-
surement based on OEVA and TEVA. TEVA 
fits better than EVA for measuring firm’s 
overall financial performance, and OEVA is 
a robust metric that provides an informative 
view of ongoing operations. A distinct ad-
vantage and, perhaps, the most important 
property of the OEVA is that it is unaf-
fected by the firm’s financing decisions. 
Both the OEVA and TEVA are computation-
ally transparent and straightforward for 
interpretation. And on top, the valuation 
models with OEVA and TEVA as the valu-
ation attributes are equivalent to the fun-
damental discounted cash flow model. Next 
section offers a compact presentation of the 
valuation-related issues.
Valuing a firm by TEVA and OEVA 
discounting
The value V of a levered firm at time t in 
terms of TEVA is equal to the book invested 
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capital at time t plus the present value of 
all expected future TEVAs. In symbols,
( )
1
1
L
sU
t t t s
s
V IC TEVA k −+
=
≡ + ⋅ +∑ , (15)
where the upper value L of a summation 
index s denotes the expected end of life of 
the company. Typically, L = ∞ for a going 
concern, but can be a finite year for those 
cases where the firm is expected to have 
a  finite life.
The structure of TEVA valuation model 
is similar to that of the conventional EVA 
model
V IC EVA WACCt t t s t j
j
s
s
L
≡ + +( )+ +
−
==
∏∑ 1 1
11
, (16)
and if done consistently, they both yield the 
same value as the basic free cash flow (FCF) 
valuation model
( ) 1
1 1
1
sL
t t s t j
s j
V FCF WACC
−
+ +
= =
≡ +∑ ∏ . (17)
Symbol Π in equations (16) and (17) de-
notes the product. Appendix A provides an 
algebraic proof of equivalence of the TEVA 
and FCF valuation models.
The value of levered firm at time t can 
also be expressed as the sum of its book 
invested capital, the present value of ex-
pected OEVAs (V OEVA) and the value of the 
interest tax shields (V TS):
OEVA TS
t t t tV IC V V= + + , (18)
( )
1
1
L
sOEVA U
t t s
s
V OEVA k −+
=
≡ +∑ , (19)
( )
1
1
L
sTS U
t t s
s
V TS k −+
=
≡ +∑ . (20)
Since the value of a levered firm is also 
equal to the sum of its value VU were it un-
levered and the value of the interest tax shields
U TS
t t tV V V= + , (21)
then it immediately follows that discounting 
expected OEVAs at the cost of unlevered 
equity kU and adding the book invested 
capital yields the value V U of unlevered 
firm, which is the present value of expected 
future free cash flows discounted at kU:
V IC V
FCF k
t
OEVA
t t
U
t s
U s
s
L
+ = ≡
≡ ⋅ +( )+
−
=
∑ 1
1
.
 (22)
The key difference between the TEVA and 
EVA valuation models is that the cost of un-
levered equity kU is applied both to calculate 
the metric and to discount the forecasted 
annual TEVAs, while EVA is calculated and 
discounted with WACC. This difference is 
a source of advantage of the TEVA valuation 
model over the EVA model in the real-life 
applications. To see why, recall that the val-
ue of firm is equal to the present value of 
its future free cash flows discounted at WACC 
only when WACC is the market weighted 
average of the cost of equity and the cost of 
debt. Therefore, to maintain consistency in 
the valuation model, WACC has to be recal-
culated period by period to account for the 
changes in the capital structure and to a pos-
sibly changing cost of debt arising from the 
operating, investment and financing decisions 
made by the management. Different numer-
ic values for WACC should be applied each 
year to calculate and discount EVA, and here 
the analyst is confronted with a triple cir-
cularity problem. To calculate EVA she needs 
to know WACC, to calculate WACC she in 
turn needs to know V, and to calculate V she 
needs to know the values of EVA and WACC 
in all future periods of the forecast horizon. 
This circularity issue, though solvable either 
numerically or analytically [Vélez-Pareja, 
Tham, 2009; Mejia-Pelaez, Vélez-Pareja, 
2011], adds substantially to building up com-
putational complexities in structuring and 
handling consistent EVA valuation model.
On the contrary, the discount rate kU in 
the OEVA–TEVA based valuation model is 
independent of changes in the capital struc-
ture and could be assumed constant (unless 
the firm decides to change its business mix, 
substantially altering the systematic risk 
of operations). Consequently, the OEVA–
TEVA valuation requires much fewer restric-
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tive assumptions to estimate the cost of 
capital and therefore, less prone to errors 
in the periodic and present value calcula-
tions. The OEVA–TEVA model is free of 
implicit and explicit complexities and in-
consistences discussed in the previous sec-
tions and simpler than the EVA model both 
analytically and computationally.
Decomposition of the Market Value Added
The Market Value Added (MVA) can also be 
reformulated in terms of TEVA. Just re-
membering that the value of firm equals its 
book invested capital plus the present value 
of expected future TEVAs, one immediate-
ly obtains that the firm’s MVA is equal to 
the present value of the expected future 
TEVAs discounted at the cost of unlevered 
equity kU. Stating in symbols
( )
1
1
L
sU
t t s
s
MVA TEVA k −+
=
= ⋅ +∑ . (23)
Relying on the additivity of present val-
ues and in line with the OEVA–TEVA ap-
proach of disaggregating overall performance 
into the operating and financing components, 
we can split MVA into the Operations Value 
Added (OVA) and the Financing Value Added 
(FVA):
t t tMVA OVA FVA= + . (24)
The OVA is defined as the present value 
of expected future OEVAs discounted at kU, 
and it accounts for the value of firm’s op-
erations over and above the capital invested:
( )
1
1
L
sU
t t s
s
OVA OEVA k −+
=
= +∑ . (25)
The FVA measures how much value has 
been added or destroyed by the firm’s finan-
cial maneuvers. Basically, it is the present 
value of expected interest tax shields:
TS
t tFVA V= , (26)
but can also include other effects of financing, 
such as issuance costs and commissions, debt 
and tax subsidies, financial distress costs.
This decomposition of MVA is similar to 
the Adjusted Present Value (APV) analysis 
of [Myers, 1974] in the capital budgeting, 
and in the context of performance evaluation, 
it can help managers to see not only how 
much value is added to the money investors 
have put into the firm, but also where the 
value comes from. [Adserà, Viñolas, 2003] 
elaborated a method of explicitly incorporat-
ing financing effects (such as contributions 
from tax shields and bankruptcy costs) into 
the EVA and discounted cash flow valuation 
models, however, their results are limited to 
the particular case of growing perpetuities.
Terminal value formulae for the OEVA–
TEVA valuation model
When performing a valuation the future is 
usually divided into two periods: the explic-
it forecast period of N years where the valu-
ation attribute is forecasted a year by year 
from the projected financial statements, and 
the perpetuity period after that, accounted 
for by the terminal value. With respect to 
the TEVA valuation model, there is a choice 
of several interchangeable options for the 
terminal value calculation under the standard 
steady state assumptions of a constant growth 
rate TVg  and a constant return ROICTV on 
new investments in perpetuity. Here we pres-
ent the formulations derived, and details of 
derivation are available in the Appendix B.
The first formulation is in terms of TEVA:
TEVA
N n NTV IC TV= + , (27)
TV
TEVA
k
TEVA TEVA
k k g
N
TEVA N
U
N N
U U
TV
≡ +
+
−
⋅ −( )
+
+ +
1
2 1 .
. (28)
And the second one, similar to the “key 
value driver formula” mentioned in [Koller, 
Goedhart, Wessels, 2010, p. 119], is in terms 
of the TEVA drivers:
TV
TEVA
k
M g TS
k k gN
TEVA N
U
TV n
U U
TV
≡ +
+ ⋅
⋅ −( )
+ +1 1 , (29)
where
M NOPAT
g
ROIC
ROIC kN
TV
TV
TV
U= ⋅ ⋅ −( )+1 .
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Both expressions (28) and (29) are equiv-
alent to the standard Gordon-type terminal 
value formula in the free cash flow valuation 
model
1N
N
TV TV
FCF
TV
WACC g
+
≡
−
, (30)
where WACCTV is the weighted average cost 
of capital for the firm in perpetuity.
The TV expressions (28) and (29) can 
also be restated in terms of OEVA and the 
interest tax shields in perpetuity
TEVA OEVA TS
N N NTV TV TV= + ,  (31)
where
1NTS
N U
TV
TS
TV
k g
+
=
−
,  (32)
TV
OEVA
k
M
k k gN
OEVA N
U U U
TV
≡ +
−( )
+1 , (33)
or, equivalently,
TV
OEVA
k
OEVA OEVA
k k g
N
OEVA N
U
N N
U U
TV
≡ +
+
−
−( )
+
+ +
1
2 1 .
 (34)
Note, that formulas (28) and (34) require 
explicit calculations of the valuation attri-
butes for the two extra periods, N + 1 and 
N + 2, beyond the forecast horizon of N 
years.
Concluding Remarks
Measuring financial performance is an es-
sential part of any business management 
system. None of the established financial 
metrics is perfect, and very often an idea 
of improvements falls on the path of in-
creasing complexity that in the end can eas-
ily outweigh the benefits gained. Our prop-
osition is taking three steps toward con-
structive simplification, which make the 
economic profit based performance assess-
ment easier to perform, interpret and fi-
nally integrate into the corporate perfor-
mance management system. Contrary to 
what one might expect from “simplifica-
tion”, the steps proposed do not reduce the 
quality of measurements; they improve it 
and make results more reliable.
First, we recognize that the aggregate 
income attributable to the suppliers of funds 
is essentially the sum of the NOPAT and 
the tax savings on interest. On the side of 
the firm’s investors, this is exactly the ag-
gregate book income of the stockholders and 
debt holders, net income plus interest on 
debt, which provides the factual basis for 
the estimation of economic profit earned by 
the firm in a measurement period.
Second, we use the risk of assets to cal-
culate the full charge on the money investors 
put into the firm. This is a logical extension 
of the first step, ensuring consistency in 
the financial model. Since the tax effects of 
leverage are taken into account explicitly 
in the flows, the opportunity cost of capital 
is the weighted average cost of capital un-
adjusted for taxes. This approach has its 
counterpart — Capital Cash Flow valuation 
model in the universe of discounted cash 
flow analysis [Ruback, 2002].
Third, we replace the traditional EVA, 
with the two complementary financial met-
rics: the Operating EVA (OEVA) for the 
purpose of measuring operating perfor-
mance, and the Total EVA (TEVA) for the 
purpose of measuring overall performance. 
The OEVA–TEVA approach to performance 
assessment leaves aside distortions, com-
plexities and inconsistencies inherent in the 
basic design of EVA. It is straightforward 
for interpretation and computationally sim-
pler relative to EVA; it requires much few-
er restrictive assumptions to estimate the 
cost of capital and so is less prone to errors 
that distort managerial perception of per-
formance. The key role in the OEVA–TEVA 
analysis clearly belongs to OEVA. Un dis-
torted by the side effects of financing deci-
sions it provides an informative financial 
estimate of the operating efficiency, and 
being nested in TEVA it forms the basis for 
the firm’s overall performance evaluation.
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Additional, but not the least relevant ar-
gument in support of our OEVA–TEVA prop-
osition is the equivalence of the OEVA–TEVA 
based valuation model to the fundamental 
approach of valuing a firm by cash flow dis-
counting, so that it may be also utilized as 
a standalone methodology for investment 
project appraisal and business valuation.
Appendix A
EQUIVALENCE OF THE TEVA AND FCF VALUATION
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Taking the term TEVA kt
U
+ +( )1 1  outside the 
summation we can rewrite (A.4) as
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Note that the value of the levered firm at time 
t + 1 is
( )1 1 12 1
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t s
t t sU
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TEVA
V IC
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+
+ +
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=
= +
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∑  (A.6)
and, consequently,
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After substituting (A.7) into the expression (A.5) 
the latter simplifies to
V IC
TEVA
k k
V ICt t
t
U U t t= + +
+
+
⋅ −( )+ + +1 1 11
1
1
. (A.8)
Finally, reducing to a common denominator, 
we obtain the relation of levered firm values for 
two subsequent time periods according to the 
TEVA valuation model
1 1 1
1
t t t
t t U
TEVA V IC
V IC
k
+ + ++ −
= +
+
. (A.9)
Proof of equivalence
By definition
1 1 1
U
t t t tTEVA NOPAT IC k TS+ + += − ⋅ + . (A.10)
Multiplying both sides of (A.9) with (1 + kU) 
obtain
First, we show that the yearly dynamics of the 
two valuation models are equivalent for an ar-
bitrary year t in the forecast period. Since the 
models and the discounting procedure are applied 
in the same way for any year, then the equiva-
lence must hold for any and all years. By this 
argument, the equivalence is proved.
The free cash flow valuation model
The FCF model suggests that the levered firm 
value, Vt is equal to the present value of all ex-
pected free cash flows discounted at a periodi-
cally adjusted weighted average cost of capital
( )
1 1
1
sL s
t t s t j
s j
V FCF WACC
−
+ +
= =
= +∑ ∏ ,  (A.1)
L denotes the expected end of life of the company.
Since the value at each date t includes the 
value of all subsequent cash flows, it is simpler 
to compute Vt 
by working backward from period 
t + 1, discounting that period free cash flow 
FCFt + 1 and the value Vt + 1 of free cash flows in 
year t + 2 and beyond
1 1
11
t t
t
t
FCF V
V
WACC
+ +
+
+
=
+
. (A.2)
Equation (A.2) represents yearly dynamics of a 
levered firm value according to the FCF model.
Following a common definition [Koller, Goed-
hart, Wessels, 2010, p. 154–156],
( )1t t t tFCF NOPAT IC IC −≡ − − . (A.3)
Time index t – 1 on a balance sheet or other 
stock items means end of year t – 1, or equiva-
lently, beginning of year t.
Yearly value dynamics in the TEVA valuation 
model
According to the TEVA model, the value of a 
levered firm at time t is:
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1 1 1
U U
t t t t
t t t
V V k IC IC k
TEVA V IC+ + +
+ ⋅ = + ⋅ +
+ + −
 (A.11)
Substituting (A.10) into (A.11) yields
1
1 1 1.
U U
t t t t
U
t t
t t t
V V k IC IC k
NOPAT IC k
TS V IC
+
+ + +
+ ⋅ = + ⋅ +
+ − ⋅ +
+ + −
 (A.12)
After making rearrangements and taking into 
account (A.3), equation (A.12) reduces to
1 1 1
U
t t t t tV V k TS FCF V+ + ++ ⋅ − = + . (A.13)
Factoring out Vt in the left had side of (A.13), 
obtain
1
1 11
tU
t t t
t
TS
V k FCF V
V
+
+ +
 + − = +   . (A.14)
Remembering (3), the expression (A.14) fi-
nally transforms into the (A.2) — the yearly 
dynamics of a levered value in the FCF valuation 
model.
Appendix B
DERIVATION OF THE TERMINAL VALUE FORMULAS FOR THE TEVA  
AND OEVA VALUATION
Start with the standard TV formula in the free 
cash flow valuation model, assuming constant 
growth gTV in perpetuity and a constant cost of 
capital WACCTV
TV TV
FCF
TV
WACC g . (B.1)
Under the assumption of constant return 
ROICTV on new investments starting year N + 1 
to infinity, the free cash flow is the NOPAT less 
the reinvestment to grow assets [Koller, Go ed-
hart, Wessels, 2010, p. 214]
1 1 1
TV
N N
TV
g
FCF NOPAT
ROIC+ +
 
= ⋅ −  , (B.2)
therefore
TV
NOPAT
WACC gN
N
TV TV
g
ROIC
TV
TV=
⋅ −





−
+1 1
. (B.3)
According to (3)
1NU
TV
N
TS
WACC k
TV
+
= − . (B.4)
Substituting (B.4) into (B.3) after rearrange-
ments obtain
TV
NOPAT TS
k gN
N N
U
TV
g
ROIC
TV
TV=
⋅ −




 +
−
+ +1 11
. (B.5)
Next, multiply and divide the right hand 
side of (B.5) by kU and then subtract and add 
( 1 1N TV N TVNOPAT g TS g+ +⋅ + ⋅ ) in the numerator 
of resulting expression. Regrouping members in 
the numerator yields
TV
NOPAT TS k g
k k g
NOPAT
N
N N
U
TV
U U
TV
N
g
ROIC
TV
=
+( ) ⋅ −( )
⋅ −( ) +
+
⋅
+ +
+
1 1
1
TV
ROIC k
k k g
TS g
k k g
TV
U
U U
TV
N TV
U U
TV
⋅ −( )
⋅ −( ) +
+
+ ⋅
⋅ −( ) =
+1
 (B.6)
=
+
+
+
⋅ ⋅ −( )
+
+
⋅
+ +
+
+
NOPAT TS
k
NOPAT ROIC k
TS g
N N
U
N TV
U
N
g
ROIC
TV
TV
1 1
1
1 TV
U U
TVk k g⋅ −( )
.
Remembering (8), it follows that NOPATN+1 + 
1 1N NNOPAT TS+ ++  = 1
U
N NTEVA IC k+ + ⋅ , and (B.6) finally 
transforms into the formula
 
(B.7)
TV IC
TEVA
k
NOPAT ROIC k TS g
N N
N
U
N TV
U
N T
g
ROIC
TV
TV
= + +
+
⋅ ⋅ −( )+ ⋅
+
+ +
1
1 1 V
U U
TVk k g⋅ −( )
,
which is the combination of (27) and (29).
After applying simple algebra to the numer-
ator of the last term on the right-hand side of 
(B.7)
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(B.9)
TV IC
OEVA
k
NOPAT ROIC k
k k g
N N
N
U
N TV
U
U U
TV
g
ROIC
TV
TV
= + +
+
⋅ ⋅ −( )
⋅ −
+
+
1
1
( ) + −
+TS
k g
N
U
TV
1 ,
and (B.8) transforms into
TV IC
OEVA
k
OEVA OEVA
k k g
TV
N N
N
U
N N
U U
TV
N
TS
= + +
+
−
⋅ −( ) +
+
+ +
1
2 1 .
 
(B.10)
Consequently
OEVA TS
N N N NTV IC TV TV= + + , (B.11)
TV
OEVA
k
OEVA OEVA
k k gN
OEVA N
U
N N
U U
TV
= +
−
⋅ −( ) =
+ + +1 2 1
= +
+
⋅ ⋅ −( )
⋅ −( )
+
+
OEVA
k
NOPAT ROIC k
k k g
N
U
N TV
U
U U
TV
g
ROIC
TV
TV
1
1
.
 (B.12)
NOPAT
g
ROIC
ROIC k g TSN
TV
TV
TV
U
TV N+ +⋅ ⋅ −( ) + ⋅ =1 1
= ⋅ + ⋅ −
− ⋅ ⋅ =
+ +
+
NOPAT g TS g
NOPAT
g
ROIC
k
N TV N TV
N
TV
TV
U
1 1
1
= −( ) +
+ −( ) − −( ) ⋅ =
+ +
+ + + +
NOPAT NOPAT
TS TS IC IC k
N N
N N N N
U
2 1
2 1 2 1
= 2 1N NTEVA TEVA+ +− .
Formula (B.7) transforms into the terminal val-
ue formula in terms of TEVA
TV IC
TEVA
k
TEVA TEVA
k k g
N N
N
U
N N
U U
TV
= + +
+
−
⋅ −( )
+
+ +
1
2 1 ,
 (B.8)
which is the combination of (27) and (28).
Next, equation (B.7) remembering (8) is re-
formulated in terms of OEVA
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К вопросу улучшения измерения финансовой результативности: надежная 
OEVA–TEVA как альтернатива смещенной EVA
Р. Г. Ибрагимов
Высшая школа финансов и менеджмента Российской академии народного хозяйства  
и государственной службы при Президенте РФ, Россия
И. Велес-Пареха
Консалтинговая группа (Консультирование и оценка капитала), Колумбия
В статье показано аналитически и проиллюстрировано на примерах, что традиционные из-
мерители остаточного операционного дохода, такие как экономическая добавленная стоимость 
(EVA), являются конструктивно смещенными и поэтому могут приводить к ошибкам в ана-
лизе финансовой результативности. Величина ошибки измерения зависит главным образом 
от суммы реализованного процентного налогового щита и соотношения балансовой и рыноч-
ной стоимости активов. Также идентифицированы и другие потенциально значимые источ-
ники искажений, порождаемые конструкцией EVA. В качестве надежной альтернативы пред-
лагается одновременная оценка операционной и общей результативности фирмы с помощью 
двух взаимосвязанных показателей: операционной EVA (OEVA) и полной EVA (TEVA). 
Реализация техники OEVA–TEVA проще, чем EVA, в части как аналитики, так и вычислений. 
Она также может предоставить дополнительную информацию для принятия управленческих 
решений. Состоятельность OEVA–TEVA подхода в целом подтверждается формально дока-
занной эквивалентностью корреспондирующей OEVA–TEVA модели оценки и основополага-
ющей оценки методом дисконтирования денежных потоков.
Ключевые слова: финансовое измерение результативности, операционная EVA, полная EVA, 
добавленная экономическая стоимость, добавленная рыночная стоимость, оценка.
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